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1.

H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—Spatial
Databases and GIS; K.6.5 [Computing Milieux]: Security and
Protection

Role-based access control (RBAC) has been widely adopted as
a way to streamline the maintenance of access control policies. As
the deployment of mobile devices in these settings has increased,
researchers have explored techniques for augmenting RBAC with
contextual information. Perhaps the most common extension of
RBAC is to incorporate the location constraints [9, 17, 14, 1, 20].
A common form of restriction is to constrain the use of roles to
specific geographic locations. Suppose for example that an organization has a role Manager and this role is constrained to the location Office. A user wishing to use this role must not only have the
authorization to use this role, but also be in his office when using
the role. Consequently, the user would be prevented from using the
role and the permissions granted to the role from other locations.
A major limitation of current approaches to spatially aware RBAC
is that they focus only on the location of the user issuing the role
usage request. However in many real situations whether a user can
use a role and access the resources for which access is granted to
the role may depend on the presence or absence of other users.
As an example, consider a government agency with data classified
at multiple levels of security. One policy could prohibit access to a
sensitive document if there are any civilians (i.e., non-governmental
employees) present. Another could require the presence of a supervisor when a document is signed. Yet another could require that the
subject is alone (e.g., “for your eyes only” restrictions).
In this paper, we address the problem of specifying and enforcing a novel class of location constraints, referred to as proximitybased location constraints, for RBAC for both static and mobile
environments. That is, we want to make decisions about granting
access to roles by also taking into account the location of other
users, possibly considering the proximity of those users to the requesting subject. Incorporating contextual factors in mobile environments is challenging, as these environments are inherently dynamic. As such, it is important to consider how to monitor and react
to changes in users’ locations. This challenge can be described as
enforcing continuity of usage constraints. Our approach is to adopt
the policy language semantics of the UCONABC family of access
control models [25, 18]. This family of models defines a number
of semantic structures that enable the specification of contextual
access control policies.
To illustrate the integration of continuity of usage with proximitybased constraints, consider the movement of a user from one protected region to another. For this user, it would be desirable to
preserve the existing permissions in use if possible. However, the
movement may involve entering a region in which a spatial role
is not permitted to be used. Consequently, the movement would
trigger a policy re-evaluation, revoking permissions as needed. In
addition, the movement may impact another user by violating a
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ABSTRACT
As mobile computing devices are becoming increasingly dominant
in enterprise and government organizations, the need for fine-grained
access control in these environments continues to grow. Specifically, advanced forms of access control can be deployed to ensure authorized users can access sensitive resources only when in
trusted locations. One technique that has been proposed is to augment role-based access control (RBAC) with spatial constraints. In
such a system, an authorized user must be in a designated location
in order to exercise the privileges associated with a role. In this
work, we extend spatially aware RBAC systems by defining the
notion of proximity-based RBAC. In our approach, access control
decisions are not based solely on the requesting user’s location. Instead, we also consider the location of other users in the system. For
instance, a policy in a government application could prevent access
to a sensitive document if any civilians are present. We introduce
our spatial model and the notion of proximity constraints. We define the syntax and semantics for the Prox-RBAC language, which
can be used to specify these policy constraints. We introduce our
enforcement architecture, including the protocols and algorithms
for enforcing Prox-RBAC policies, and give a proof of functional
correctness. Finally, we describe our work toward a Prox-RBAC
prototype and present an informal security analysis.
∗Dr. Kirkpatrick is now at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, kirkpams@jmu.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

condition of the latter’s policy constraints. Another challenge is to
bind the user to the device making the request, as well as the location. That is, it would be undesirable for the user to download
sensitive data to a device, then proceed to allow another user to
leave with the device (and the data).
To address these challenges, we propose Prox-RBAC, which consists of a model, policy language, and enforcement architecture
for specifying and enforcing proximity-based location constraints.
In Prox-RBAC, administrators can write policies that specify either the presence or absence of other users within a protected area.
Prox-RBAC also makes a distinction between policies that require
authorization only a single time prior to access and policies that
specify conditions that must continue to hold for as long as the permission is used. Finally, Prox-RBAC is backward compatible; that
is, Prox-RBAC can specify existing spatially aware RBAC policies,
as well as traditional RBAC. Thus, the contributions of this work
can be summarized as follows.
• We introduce the notion of proximity constraints and provide
a formal definition of these constraints.
• We specify the syntax and semantics of Prox-RBAC, a language for expressing proximity constraints in a spatial RBAC
system.
• We propose the integration of proximity constraints with continuity of usage within the context of a constrained indoor
space model.
• We define an enforcement architecture, including the specification of a cryptographic protocol and algorithms for ProxRBAC.

2. BACKGROUND
Prox-RBAC builds on the GEO-RBAC spatially aware RBAC
model. In addition, we use the UCONABC family of models to
define the semantics of the Prox-RBAC language. In this section,
we provide a brief summary of these existing works.

2.1 GEO-RBAC
Prox-RBAC is defined as an extension of GEO-RBAC, a spatially aware RBAC model. In GEO-RBAC, traditional RBAC roles
are augmented to incorporate the subject’s location. Policies can
use these spatial roles in defining fine-grained access control permissions. For instance, policies using the spatial role < M anager,
Room 513 > would require that the user activate the M anager
role (assuming the user is authorized) and be physically present in
room 513. Consequently, a subject using the role M anager would
be denied access if the request is made from another location.
A key feature of GEO-RBAC that we use in Prox-RBAC is the
differentiation of role enabling and role activation. A spatial role
is automatically enabled if the user is authorized to activate the role
and the user is physically present in the requisite location. However, an enabled role does not explicitly grant any privileges. Instead, the user must activate the role in order to exercise the associated permissions. This differentiation allows for mutually exclusive
roles and hierarchical roles to be defined on the same space. It is
the user’s specific action the determines the role applied.

2.2 UCONABC
UCONABC is a family of access control models that can be used
to formalize the behavior of a system in terms of authorizations
(A), obligations (B), and conditions (C), that must be satisfied either before (pre), during (on), or after (post) an access occurs. For

instance, UCONpreA can be used to formalize an access control
system that requires authorizing the subject before the access is
granted. With each type of model, there are multiple variations
(e.g., UCONpreA , UCONpreA , and UCONpreA ). For a full
0
1
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description of these details, we refer the reader to the UCONABC
paper [25, 18].
Specifying a policy in UCONABC can be done by declaring the
functions, relations, and other mathematical structures, and then
defining the implication that must hold if the access is granted. As
an example, consider a traditional RBAC system, where S, O, A
and R denote the sets of subjects, objects, actions, and roles, respectively. A permission is an ordered pair (o, a) for o ∈ O, a ∈
A. Subjects are mapped to active roles via the ActiveRoles function, while P ermittedRoles maps permissions with the roles that
are to be granted access. As ActiveRoles are user-specific, we
also declare AT T (S) = {ActiveRoles}, where AT T (S) specifies the set of attributes that are associated with subjects.
To specify that a subject s is authorized to perform action a on
object o, UCONpreA uses an invariant allowed(s, o, a) ⇒ P ,
0
where P denotes a necessary condition for authorization. For instance, in RBAC, the necessary condition is that the requester has
an active role (∃role ∈ ActiveRoles(s)) that is granted the desired permission (∃role0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), role ≥ role0 ).
The following example illustrates how UCONpreA can specify
0
traditional RBAC policies.
< role, act, obj > – UCONpreA :
0
P erms = {(o, a)|o ∈ O, a ∈ A}
ActiveRoles : S → 2R
P ermittedRoles : P erms → 2R
AT T (S) = {ActiveRoles}
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒ ∃role ∈ ActiveRoles(s),
∃role0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), role ≥ role0

To enforce that certain conditions continue to hold as the access
occurs (i.e., continuity of usage constraints), UCONABC defines
additional primitive formalisms. First, preCON declares a set of
conditions that are evaluated, while getP reCON (s, o, a) specifies
proposition built on these conditions. Then preConChecked can
be used in the necessary proposition in the allowed(s, o, a) ⇒ P
implication. For instance, if the subject must be over the age of 18
or accompanied by an adult, we could specify this portion of the
policy as:
preCON = {Over18(s), Accompanied(s)}
getP reCON (s, o, a) = Over18(s) ∨ Accompanied(s)
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒ preConChecked(getP reCON (s, o, a))

For on-going conditions (i.e., UCONonC ), similar structures exist (i.e., onCON and getOnCON (s, o, a)). Specifying permission revocation is similar to the allowed(s, o, a) invariant. Specifically, stopped(s, o, a) ⇐ ¬onConChecked(getOnCON (s, o, a))
declares that the access must be stopped once the on-going required
condition is no longer true.

3.

THE PROX-RBAC LANGUAGE

In this section we present the syntax and semantics of our proximity constraint language. After a short preliminary subsection to
introduce some notation, we describe our space model, which is a
key element in the definition of the proximity constraint model. We
then briefly introduce our spatial role model, followed by the introduction of the three main constructs of our proximity constraint
model. Such introduction is followed by the definition of the syntax
and semantics of the proximity constraint model.

3.1 Preliminaries
The core Prox-RBAC model, which underlies our language, uses
a number of primitives that are similar to existing spatially aware
RBAC models. As in traditional RBAC, we have Subjects (S) that
can request permission to perform Actions (A) on Objects (O).
Let Roles (R) denote the set of roles in the system. When s ∈ S
requests the privilege to perform a ∈ A on o ∈ O, s must activate
a role r ∈ R to which the requested permission is granted.

3.2 Space Model
The first challenge in defining our model is to specify how space
is modeled. We adopt a spatial model that subdivides generic spaces
into regions based on security classifications. We consider the reference space > to be a region that is divided into a set of protected
areas (PA). A PA is a physically bounded region of space, accessible through a limited number of entry points, which consists of
a physical barrier that requires authorization. Each PA can be arbitrarily large and we place no restrictions on the internal structure.
For instance, a PA could consist of a single room or an entire floor
that is made up of distinct but unlocked rooms. In the latter case,
the subject’s presence in a particular room is irrelevant to the security questions, and we model the floor in its entirety as a PA. An
entry point is a one-way walking device which connects one PA to
another PA. Should the passage be in both directions, two distinct
entry points are needed, one for each direction.
Figure 1 demonstrates a number of characteristics of our space.
The PAs are distinguished by shading and lines filling the area. The
red dots indicate the entry points and are labeled as the guard device ei,j controlling passage from pai to paj . Observe that rooms
103A and 103B are both part of pa2 , thus indicating that PAs do
not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence to the features
of the space. In addition, suite 100A defines pa3 and consists of
the entire space shaded with gray, which includes rooms 101, 102,
103A, and 103B. Similarly, pa5 covers the entire floor. This illustrates that PAs can be defined hierarchically. Finally, paO defines
the outdoor space.
To represent this constrained space we define an indoor space
model [16, 15]. Indoor space models present distinguishing features which perfectly match the requirements posed by our scenario. A major feature is that those spaces are cellular (or symbolic), i.e., they consist of a finite set of named cells or symbolic
coordinates (e.g., rooms 103A and 103B) [3]. Moreover, indoor
spaces may present complex topologies. Among the various topologies that one can specify, the most relevant are the connectivity
between the indoor and outdoor spaces, as well as connectivity between cells (i.e., PAs). We choose to define the indoor space model
as the tuple (P, E, G, H) where P is the set of PAs, E the set of
entry points, G the connectivity topology referred to as accessibility graph, and H the hierarchy of PAs. This space model allows us
to introduce the notion of accessibility graph for a specific subject,
defining the subspace in which the subject is authorized to move.

3.2.1 Hierarchy of PAs
As noted above, our model incorporates the notion of hierarchy
of PAs. For instance, access to the first floor of a building may be
restricted to a set of users; in addition, access to room 105 may be
further restricted to an individual user. As such, when the user is
in room 105, the permissions associated with the first floor should
still be granted.
To model this hierarchy, we introduce the partial order v between PAs such that pai v paj (i.e., pai is-part-of paj ) means: i)
any subject present in pai is also present in paj ; ii) pai can be only
entered if the subject is present in paj ; iii) if pai is part of both paj

Figure 1: Reference space with PAs marked
and pak then either pak v paj or paj v pak .1 Note that the meaning of the partial order relation is not simply of spatial containment.
That motivates the second condition which explicitly requires the
two PAs to be connected through an entry point. For instance, consider a room (Room 204) whose only entrance is a private stairwell
from a room on the first floor; since this room is not reachable from
any other part of the second floor, Room 204 6v F loor 2. The
third condition states that the partial order takes the form of a tree
where the root is the reference space and the leaves are the PAs
which do not contain further PAs. Note that, as v is a partial order, if pai v paj it cannot happen that paj v pai , for i 6= j.
Therefore, the number of subjects in paj is equal or greater than
the sum of the subjects in the children of paj . This partial order
leads naturally to the notion of type; for instance, if pai is of the
room type and paj is the f loor type, it is possible that pai v paj ,
but it cannot happen that paj v pai . In addition, we write s ∈l pa
to express the user’s location at the finest granularity. That is, if
s ∈l pai , then 6 ∃paj with paj v pai and i 6= j such that s ∈l paj .
Figure 2(b) illustrates the hierarchy corresponding to Figure 1.

3.2.2

Accessibility graph

The accessibility graph represents the relationship of connectivity among PAs through a directed multigraph (multidigraph). Figure 2 shows the accessibility graph for the space in Figure 1. The
accessibility graph consists of a set V of vertices each representing
either the outdoor space or a PA, and a multiset A ⊆ V × V of
edges, one for each entry point connecting one PA to another PA.
The direction of edges reflects the direction of entrypoints. Edges
are labelled with the corresponding entrypoints, i.e., ei,j (or eki,j ,
for some k > 0 in case of multiple entry points from pai to paj ).
If there is a path between the two vertex representing pai and paj
respectively, we say that paj is reachable from pai . If the path
consists of a unique edge then paj is directly reachable. Main entrance and main exit are the vertices that are directly reachable
from paO and from which paO can be directly reached, respectively. The graph G is assumed to connected. Moreover, for the
accessibility graph to be consistent with the hierarchy of PA, the
following properties must hold.
Properties (Accessibility Graph)
• Every PA must be directly reachable from either the parent
or sibling in the hierarchy of PA. This follows from the fact
1
To simplify the model, in our context, PAs can only overlap if
one is wholly contained within the other. However, one could extend the model to allow overlapping PAs, at the cost of increased
complexity of the hierarchical processing.

reached through the parent or a sibling, when the subject is at an
entry point ei,j , the system can refer to the accessibility graph of
the subject to determine whether the subject is authorized to enter
the target PA.

3.3

(a) Accessibility graph

(b) Hierarchy of PAs

Figure 2: Accessibility graph and hierarchy of PAs for Figure 1
that a PA can be only entered if the subject is present in the
parent PA.
• The main entrances must correspond to the PAs at the highest
level in the hierarchy of PA. This follows from the fact that
otherwise a PA could be entered from a PA which is different
from the parent or sibling, against the definition of hierarchy
of PAs.
• The graph also does not contains loops (i.e., edges do not
start from and end to the same vertex).

3.2.3

Accessibility graph for a subject

Intuitively, the entrance of a subject into a PA corresponds to
the transition from one vertex to an adjacent vertex in the accessibility graph. Key to our definition of the security system is the
authentication and confirmation of passage. That is, enforcement
of Prox-RBAC requires a physical barrier separating PAs, as well as
deployment of a technology that ensures only authorized personnel
can pass. Detecting such a movement requires the subject’s presence at an entry point. However, we must also have a way to detect
that the subject did, in fact, pass through the entry point, rather than
doubling back into the current space. As we will describe in Section 4.4, ensuring the trustworthiness of position is a challenging
issue in deployment of spatially aware RBAC systems.
Besides passage confirmation, the other aspect of concern that
we consider here regards the authentication of passage. Subjects, in
general, are not allowed to enter every PA. We denote with AuthPA(s)
the set of PAs that the subject s is authorized to enter. For this set to
be consistently defined, every PA in the set must be reachable from
the outdoor space and, vice versa, the outdoor space must be reachable from any PA in the set. It can be shown that these requirements
are met if the following conditions are satisfied.
Properties (Authorized PAs)
• If pa ∈ AuthPA(s), then the parent of pa must also be in
AuthPA(s).
• If pa ∈ AuthPA(s) and pa is only reachable from one or
more siblings in the hierarchy, then all these siblings must
also be in AuthPA(s).
The subgraph with vertices that are the authorized PAs and edges
that are the subset of edges which connect the authorized PAs is
itself an accessibility graph, namely it represents the accessibility
graph of the subject. Therefore, because every PA of the set can be

Spatial Roles

As in GEO-RBAC, we augment traditional roles with geographic
information. Specifically, a spatial role is the tuple < r, pa >,
where r ∈ R and pa ∈ P ∪ {>}, where > denotes the reference
space. A spatial role < r, pa > is enabled for the subject s if s has
activated the traditional role r, and, in addition, one of these two
conditions is satisfied: a) s ∈l pa; ii) s ∈l pai and pai v pa. Note
that if subject s has been assigned role < r, pa > with pa ∈ P,
then s must be authorized to enter pa, i.e., pa ∈ AuthPA(s), otherwise the role would have never been enabled. The spatial role is
then activated if the user wishes to exercise the privileges associated with the role. If user s has activated role < r, pa >, we write
< r, pa >∈ ActiveRoles(s).
While role activation in Prox-RBAC seems intuitive, subtle challenges arise when users are permitted to maintain contintuous access across PA boundaries. To be precise, consider a user who
moves from pai to paj and what should happen to < r, pai >∈
ActiveRoles(s). In order to streamline the user experience, ProxRBAC keeps the roles active, but updates the location from pai to
paj . That is, if < r, pai >∈ ActiveRoles(s) prior to the transition, then < r, paj >∈ ActiveRoles(s) after. Additionally, if
s 6∈ pai after the transition (i.e., paj 6v pai ), then < r, paj >6∈
ActiveRoles(s). One exception to this automatic activation of
< r, paj > occurs when mutually exclusive roles are defined.
Specifically, if < r, paj > would conflict with another activated
role < r0 , paj >, then both are deactivated in the transition.2
Although it would be desirable to treat the movement as atomic,
we find this insufficient to provide strong location guarantees. For
instance, a user could initiate the movement with an entry point,
then wait for several seconds before actually passing through the
doorway. Thus, our access control policies must account for the
time between authorization and the actual passage between the PAs.
As such, the transition triggers a movement event, during which
the user’s location is identified as s ∈l pak , where pak is the least
common ancestor, the smallest PA that contains both the old and
new PAs. That is, pai v pak , paj v pak , and either pai 6v pal or
paj 6v pal for any pal ∈ Children(pak ), where Children(pak )
is defined by the hierarchy of PAs. In addition, permissions currently in use will be revoked during the movement event only if the
permission is not granted for < r, paj > and paj 6v pai . Otherwise, the permissions are retained.

3.4

Continuous Proximity Constraints

A proximity constraint is a security requirement that is satisfied by the location of other users. If the constraint must be continuously evaluated for the duration of the user’s access session,
then we call the constraint continuous. Proximity constraints are
built from three primitive constructs: relative constraint clauses,
continuity of usage constraints, and timeouts. Relative constraint
clauses define the static presence or absence conditions that must
be met. However, mobile environments are inherently dynamic. As
such, the latter two constructs are necessary to ensure the relative
constraint clause is enforced properly as the environment changes.
A relative constraint clause specifies the proximity requirement
of other users in the spatial environment. These clauses can be
described as either presence constraints or absence constraints.
2

The deactivation does not occur if < r, paj > would conflict with
a role < r0 , paj > that is enabled but not currently activated.

To formulate these conditions, we adopt an intuitive syntax that can
be illustrated as follows:
at_most 0 civilian in Room 105
The basic structure consists of an optional cardinality qualifier (e.g.,
at_most or at_least), a nonnegative integer specifying the number of subjects, a role (e.g., civilian), and a spatial relationship
(e.g., in Room 105). The spatial relationship consists of two parts:
a topological relation and a logical location descriptor that identifies a PA. Let RT denote the set of topological relations. In our initial approach, we will only consider a small set of relations, namely
RT = {in, out, adj}. The location descriptor can be absolute, as
was the case here, or it can take the form of this.type. In this latter
structure, the type specifies a level in the hierarchy of PAs, while
this dictates that the location of the subject fulfilling the role in the
clause must match that of the requester. For instance, let vi denote
Room 105, vj denote Room 100, and vk denote F loor 1. Assume
the requester is in Room 105 and his supervisor is in Room 100.
Since vi v vk and vj v vk , the following relative constraint clause
would be satisfied:
at_least 1 supervisor in this.f loor
Some operations may require a significant duration. For instance,
reading a sensitive document may take several minutes or hours.
Furthermore, it may be necessary to ensure the relative constraint
holds for the entire duration of the permitted session. To declare
whether the constraint must be checked only at the beginning of
the session or must hold for the duration, we introduce into our
language continuity of usage qualifiers, called when and while,
respectively. Their use is illustrated as follows:
while ( at_most 0 civilian in Room 105 )
A when constraint is evaluated at the access request time; if the
constraint is satisfied, the permission is granted. A while constraint is repeatedly checked and the permission is granted until the
constraint is violated. The frequency of the check is a system-wide
parameter that is dependent on the deployment scenario. That is,
specifying this parameter requires considering issues such as network latency, size of the spatial environment, number and mobility
of users.
In many cases, the desired security guarantees may require satisfying multiple relative constraints. To allow for such cases, we
permit the use of two basic logical connectives: ∨ (logical or) and
∧ (logical and). These logical connectives can be used to join relative constraint clauses or continuity of usage constraints. Parentheses may be used to specify precedence; otherwise, the clauses are
enforced left-to-right. As an example, assume that c1 is a while
constraint dictating that no civilians are present. In addition, either
a supervisor or accountant must initially be present (c2 or c3 ). The
following constraints are equivalent in expressing this requirement:
while ( c1 ) ∧ ( when ( c2 ) ∨ when ( c3 ) )
while ( c1 ) ∧ when ( c2 ∨ c3 )
One critical issue in enforcing continuity of usage constraints is
how to react once a while constraint no longer holds. In one scenario, the permission could be suspended until the condition is once
again satisfied. In others, it may be acceptable to allow some leeway, wherein the permission is still granted for a short duration of
time, even though the condition is technically being violated. For
instance, consider a proximity constraint that specifies a supervisor
must be present to read an accounting record. Due to a shift change,
one supervisor leaves the room before the next arrives. However,
the break is short enough that it is acceptable to allow the subject
to retain the permission during their absences.

In some cases, it is acceptable for proximity constraints to be
violated for a brief duration. For instance, if the policy specifies the
presence of a supervisor, it would be undesirable for the employee
to lose permissions while the supervisor leaves for a short break.
Consequently, every proximity constraint that includes at least one
while clause must end with a timeout constraint, which takes the
following form:
while ( clause ) timeout t
Here, t ∈ N0 specifies the maximum amount of time for which
the permission is granted once the while constraint fails. While
the simplest approach is to use a single time unit for all timeout
constraints, a straightforward augmentation of our language could
allow t to specify the units, as well. If t = 0, then the permission is
immediately revoked. If the condition is once again satisfied before
the time limit has been reached, the permission is automatically
extended as if the condition held for the entire duration.

3.5

Prox-RBAC Syntax

To formalize this syntax,3 let C denote the set of basic relative
constraint clauses with no Boolean connectives. Formally, we can
write c =< q, n, r, rt , p >, where q is a cardinality qualifier,
n ∈ N0 , r ∈ R, rt ∈ RT , and p ∈ P. C ∗ , then, denotes the
set of clauses that can be constructed from a Boolean formula of
basic clauses. This produces the following grammar for constraint
clauses:
C :: − C ∨ C
|
C ∧C
|
Q n role topo pa
Q :: − at_most | at_least | 
Now, let W denote the set of continuity of usage constraints.
That is, while ( c ) ∈ W and when ( c ) ∈ W if c ∈ C ∗ . Given
that timeouts can only apply to while constraints, we create a distinguished set Wwhile ⊆ W that consists exclusively of the constraints while ( c ), where c ∈ C ∗ . As before, let W ∗ denote the set
of Boolean conjunctions and disjunctions that can be formed from
any combination of continuity of usage constraints.4 This leads to
the following rules:
W :: − W ∨ W
|
W ∧W
|
when ( C )
|
while ( C )
Finally, let T denote the set of timeouts written as timeout t,
where t denotes a finite unit of time, and let  ∈ T . We write
Φ = (W ∗ × T ) ∪ {⊥} to denote the set of all possible proximity
constraints, where ⊥ denotes the absence of a proximity constraint,
which allows for traditional spatially aware policies.

3.6

Prox-RBAC Policies and Semantics

A Prox-RBAC policy is a tuple of the form < sr, a, o, ϕ >,
where sr ∈ R × {P ∪ {>}}, a ∈ A, o ∈ O, and ϕ ∈ Φ.
In this section, we present the formal semantics for Prox-RBAC
3
For the sake of simplicity, we omit from our grammars any parentheses that can be used to indicate Boolean formulas. We feel that
including them in the specification needlessly complicates the discussion and distracts the reader from the most relevant topics.
4
Observe that negations are not necessary in our language. First,
negations would only be applicable in joining relative constraint
clauses (i.e., statements such as not while ( c ) would be
awkward). Second, the at_most and at_least qualifiers are
clear opposites when the numbers are adjusted accordingly (e.g.,
at_most 0 is the negation of at_least 1). Thus, our language can
express negations without introducing an explicit Boolean operator.

in terms of the UCONABC family of core models. Prox-RBAC
employs U CONAC semantics, as we require authorizations (A)
and conditions (C), but not obligations (B). In all of the semantic
specifications below, ≥ can denote either the dominance relation
on the partially ordered set of roles R or the traditional inequality
on integers. The notation 2S refers to the power set of the set S.
We start with the simplest case, in which ϕ = ⊥. That is, there
is no proximity constraint enforced, and the policy indicates a spatially aware RBAC role as defined in existing works. We can write
these semantics formally as a UCONpreA policy.

combination of simple relative constraint clauses. Hence, EvalW
evaluates each simple clause independently, then evaluates the resulting Boolean expression. Finally, Eval itself operates on the
full when clause, evaluating the Boolean expression that is produced by evaluating each simple when clause. This produces the
following UCONpreC semantics:
0

< role, act, obj, when > – UCONpreC :
0

[premises from < role, act, obj, ⊥ >]
Eval : W ∗ × P → {true, f alse}
Location : S → P
preCON = {Eval(when, Location(s))}
getP reCON (s, o, a) = Eval(when, Location(s))
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒
preConChecked(getP reCON (s, o, a)) ∧
( ∃ r ∈ EnabledRoles(pa), s ∈l pa ∧ r ∈ ActiveRoles(s) ∧
∃ r0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), r ≥ r 0 )

0

< role, act, obj, ⊥ > – UCONpreA :
0
role =< r, pa >, r ∈ R, pa ∈ P
P erms = {(o, a)|o ∈ O, a ∈ A}
ActiveRoles : S → 2R
EnabledRoles : P → 2R
P ermittedRoles : P erms → 2R
AT T (S) = {ActiveRoles}
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒ ∃ r ∈ EnabledRoles(pa),
s ∈l pa ∧ r ∈ ActiveRoles(s) ∧
∃ r 0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), r ≥ r0

These semantics state that, if s is allowed to perform a on o,
there must be a traditional RBAC role r that is enabled by entering
pa, s is physically present there, and s has activated the role. In
addition, r must dominate r0 , which is a traditional RBAC role that
is permitted to perform a on o. Obviously, it may be the case that
r = r0 . However, when hierarchical roles are created, r ≥ r0
implies that activating r inherits all of the permissions associated
with r0 . As this is UCONpreA , this policy is checked only once
0
prior to granting access. Finally, note that the same semantics can
be applied for traditional RBAC policies, which can be expressed
with pa = >, indicating that role activation can occur anywhere.
Thus, Prox-RBAC semantics are flexible enough to accommodate
more traditional policies.
To define the semantics for when and while constraints, we
must define a number of helper functions, which are listed in Figure 3. T opoSat defines the conditions under which topological
relations are satisfied. Observe that in and out are not simply satisfied by containment. Instead, Prox-RBAC considers the PA describing the subject’s location at the finest granularity. As an illustration, recall the example in Section 3.2.1 in which Room 204 6v
F loor 2; if s ∈l Room 204, then T opoSat(s, in, F loor 2) returns false. adj, on the other hand, does not consider the finest
granularity of the user’s location. Instead, adj is satisfied if the
subject is in a PA that is immediately reachable from the PA under consideration (or vice versa); furthermore, neither PA can be
a parent of the other. T opoSat is used in the context of the Sat
function, which determines if a constraint has been satisfied.
Building on these functions, we can define what it means to satisfy a relative constraint clause c ∈ C ∗ . Recall that c can either
be a simple clause (c ∈ C)), or it can be a complex clause that
is created from disjuctions and/or conjunctions of simple clauses.
That is, c =< c0 , b1 , c1 , . . . , bn , cn >, where ci is a simple clause
and bi is a Boolean connective. For each simple clause ci , we have
ci =< q, n, role, topo, pa >. First, we apply c0i = Cast(ci ),
which replaces the original pa with the PA of the correct type. Note
that Cast only changes ci if pa is of the form this.τ , where τ indicates a type (e.g., room, suite, floor); that is, Cast converts the
relative pa into an absolute pa0 . Now, we can apply Sat to the individual components of c0i . This procedure describes the functionality of EvalC, which evaluates a simple constraint clause based
on the subject’s location.
Similarly, a when clause w ∈ W ∗ consists of a Boolean combination of simple when clauses, each of which contains a Boolean

W hile constraints with a timeout of 0 (i.e., immediate revocation) are very similar to when constraints, with the exception that a
subset of the conditions are repeatedly checked as the permission is
exercised. To model this behavior, we introduce the W henT oBool
function, which takes a Boolean combination of when and while
clauses and replaces the when clause with either true or f alse according to the initial evaluation. The result of this extension is the
following UCONpreC onC0 semantics:
0

< role, act, obj, while > – UCONpreC onC0 :
0
[premises from < role, act, obj, when >]
W henT oBool : W ∗ × P → W ∗
preCON = {Eval(while, Location(s))}
getP reCON (s, o, a) = Eval(while, Location(s))
onCON = {Eval(W henT oBool(while), Location(s))}
getOnCON (s, o, a) =
Eval(W henT oBool(while), Location(s))
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒
preConChecked(getP reCON (s, o, a))∧
(∃ r ∈ EnabledRoles(pa), s ∈l pa ∧ r ∈ ActiveRoles(s) ∧
∃ r0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), r ≥ r 0 )
stopped(s, o, a) ⇐
¬onConChecked(getOnCON (s, o, a))

The final type of constraint to consider is a while constraint
with a timeout t > 0. Here, we introduce X to denote the data
structures containing expiration times for permissions. That is,
P ermExp(s) will return x ∈ X . The simplest form of x would
be a 2-dimensional array O × A, where (o, a) would store the expiration time for exercising a ∈ A on o ∈ O. As such, we use the
notation x[o, a] for this value, though we formalize this behavior
with the F indExp function. The U pdateExp function takes such
a data structure, and updates only the x[o, a] entry to be tc + te , the
sum of the current system time and the expiration time. All other
entries remain unchanged.
Using these functions, we extend the UCONpreC onC0 model
0

5

to express while constraints with a timeout using the following
semantics. Our extension is to introduce the onU pdate(AT T (s))
procedure to update the subject’s P ermExp attribute as the access
occurs. During access, if the condition holds (i.e., the while clause
is satisfied), then the expiration is updated accordingly. The permission is revoked only if the condition fails and the current time
is greater than the expiration time.
5
UCONABC does not define an onU pdate procedure for conditions, but it does for authorizations and obligations. However, we
find it very straightforward to augment the model to support the
same functionality for conditions.

T opoSat : S × RT × P → {true, f alse}
T opoSat(s, rt , p) = true if and only if one of these hold:
rt = in and ∃p0 ∈ P (s ∈l p0 ∧ p0 v p)
rt = out and ∃p0 ∈ P (s ∈l p0 ∧ p0 6v p)
rt = adj and ∃p0 , p00 ∈ P (s ∈l p0 ) ∧ (p0 v p00 )∧
(p00 6v p) ∧ (p 6v p00 ) ∧ ((p00 , p) ∈ E ∨ (p, p00 ) ∈ E)
Sat : C → {true, f alse}
Sat(c) = true if and only if
c =< q, n, role, topo, pa >, cmp = Inequality(q) and
∃S 0 ⊆ S, |S 0 |cmp n
∀s ∈ S 0 ∃role0 ∈ ActiveRoles(s) such that
(role = role0 ∧ T opoSat(s, topo, pa))
Cast : C × P → C
[omitted for brevity, but type definition is shown]
[replaces “this” keyword according to specified PA]

EvalC : C × P → {true, f alse}
EvalC(c, pa) = Sat(Cast(c, pa))
EvalW : W × P → {true, f alse}
EvalW (< w, c >, pa) =
BoolEval(< c00 , b1 , c01 , . . . , bn , c0n >) where
c =< c0 , b1 , c1 , . . . , bn , cn > and
∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, c0i = EvalC(ci , pa)
W henT oBool : W ∗ × P → W ∗
W henT oBool(< w0 , b1 , w1 , . . . , bn , wn >, pa) =
0 >, where ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n
< w00 , b1 , w10 , . . . , bm , wm
wi ∈ Wwhile ⇒ wi0 = wi
wi 6∈ Wwhile ⇒ wi0 = EvalW (wi , pa)
Eval : W ∗ × P → {true, f alse}
Eval(< w0 , b1 , w1 , . . . , bn , wn >, pa) =
0 >), where
BoolEval(< w00 , b1 , w10 , . . . , bm , wm
∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, wi0 = EvalW (wi , pa)

Figure 3: Helper functions for evaluating Prox-RBAC semantics
< role, act, obj, while, time > – UCONpreC onC0 :
0
[premises from < role, act, obj, when >]
CurentT ime ∈ R is the current system time
P ermExp : S → X
U pdateExp : X × O × A × Z+ × Z+ → X
F indExp : X × O × A → Z+
AT T (S) = {ActiveRoles, P ermExp}
onCON = {Eval(W henT oBool(while, Location(s))),
CurrentT ime ≤ F indExp(P ermExp(s), o, a)}
getOnCON (s, o, a) =
( Eval(W henT oBool(while, Location(s))) ∨
CurrentT ime ≤ F indExp(P ermExp(s), o, a) )
allowed(s, o, a) ⇒
preConChecked(getP reCON (s, o, a))∧
(∃ r ∈ EnabledRoles(pa), s ∈l pa ∧ r ∈ ActiveRoles(s) ∧
∃ r0 ∈ P ermittedRoles(o, a), r ≥ r 0 )
onU pdate(P ermExp(s)) : P ermExp(s) =
U pdateExp(P ermExp(s), o, a, t, time) if
Eval(W henT oBool(while, Location(s)))
stopped(s, o, a) ⇐
¬onConChecked(getOnCON (s, o, a))

4. IMPLEMENTATION
As a proof of concept, we have implemented a Prox-RBAC prototype. Our architectural design couples a centralized authorization
server with a distributed, asynchronous clients. These clients can
be either stationary (e.g., workstations) or mobile devices (e.g., laptops). In either case, accessing sensitive data requires providing a
high-integrity proof of location that is generated with the help of a
fixed-location device, such as an near-field communication (NFC)
or magnetic stripe reader. In addition, passage through an entry
point must be monitored and controlled by a fixed-location device
that reports the user’s location change to the centralized server. In
this section, we describe the principals of our enforcement architecture, our multi-factor authentication protocol and algorithm for
requesting access to a protected resource, and a description of our
implementation features. We then use these definitions to present
the sketch of a formal proof of correctness.

4.1 Principals
Our Prox-RBAC prototype is built on interaction between four
principals. First, the Authorization Server (AS) is the centralized
server that acts as the policy decision point (PDP). The AS maintains a mapping of all users’ locations, represented at the finestgranularity PA that applies. The AS also maintains all access control policies. Next, the User refers to the human user requesting
access. Each user (subject) s will have an identifier ids , a password

pwds 6 , and a proximity-connection device that is used for generating the proof of location. This portable device will have a secret
value sv(s), as well as a certificate, signed by the AS, that contains
data required to perform an interactive zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge protocol that demonstrates possession of sv(s).
The user performs the access control protocol using a Client,
which is a trusted computing device for accessing sensitive data.
The client acts as the policy enforcement point (PEP), revoking
privileges when requested by the AS. As clients may be mobile,
they are identified solely by an identifier and denoted ci . Each
client has a network connection to communicate with the AS and
is equipped with a trusted computing component (TCC), such as a
TPM, that can bind keys to applications. That is, the application
requesting access to a protected resource will have a public-private
key pair, denoted pk(ci ) and sk(ci ) respectively, and a certificate
Cert(ci ) signed by AS. For simplicity, we assume the presence of
a trusted path for the user to enter a password. Additionally, we assume unauthorized software is prevented from accessing sensitive
data, and remote attestation techniques are used to ensure that the
software on the client matches a pre-approved configuration.
A Location Device (LD) is a fixed-location reader distributed in
a PA. These devices are used to authenticate the location of the
user at the time of an access request. Since these devices have
fixed locations, each is denoted ldi,j to indicate the j th location
device in pai . Each LD employs a proximity-based communication
technology and possesses a certificate Cert(ldi,j ) that is signed by
the AS. These certificates contain coordinates cdt(ldi,j ), as well
as data that allows AS to retrieve sv(ldi,j ), a secret value stored
on ldi,j . For example, this data could be an encrypted version of
sv(ldi,j ), where only AS has the corresponding key. In order to
bind the user and client to the location, the client and LD must have
a physical connection. For instance, the LD could be integrated in
a laptop base station that is built into a desk.7

4.2 Access Request
Our access request protocol is built on a number of cryptographic
primitives. First, let (Gen,Enc,Dec) denote both public key and
symmetric key encryption schemes. In both cases, k ← Gen(1n )
6
Other user authentication mechanisms, such as public key certificates, could also be used in place of a password.
7
One could argue that the physical connection between the client
and LD obviates the need for the proximity-based communication
device that the user carries. However, the device would be a small
persistent device that the user employs for entrance to secured areas
and other activities, as well. As such, the device is simply used to
provide an additional layer of authentication.

Read(s, o, r, ci , ldj,k ) – Subject s activates role r and requests read
privilege on object o, using client ci at location device ldj,k .
(1)
s ↔ ldj,k
Prove(sv(s))
(2)
s → ci
ids , pwds , r
(3)
ci → ldj,k Signsk(ci ) (ids ), Cert(ci )
(4)
(5)
(6)

[ldj,k ]
ldj,k → ci
ci → AS
ci ↔ AS

h := H(nkids kT kpk(ci )ksv(ldj,k ))
c ← Commit(h)
Signsk(ci ) (c), Cert(ci )
Auth(ids , pwds , r)

(7)
(8)

[AS]
AS → ci
ci → ldj,k

K ← Gen(1n )
Encpk(ci ) (K), EncK (Signsk(AS) (c, pk(ci ))
Signsk(AS) (c, pk(ci ))

(9)

[ldj,k ]
ldj,k → ci

(10)

ci → AS

(11)

AS → ci

K0 ← Gen(1n )
Cert(ldj,k ), Encpk(AS) (K0 ),
EncK0 (Open(c, h))
o, Cert(ldj,k ), Encpk(AS) (K0 ),
EncK0 (Open(c, h))
EncK (ô)

Figure 4: Protocol for requesting read access
denotes a probabilistic key generation algorithm and m := Deck (c)
denotes the decryption of ciphertext c using the key k. In the public
key case, c ← Enck (m) is an IND-CPA-secure encryption (which
is probabilistic), while c := Enck (m) denotes (t, )-secure (deterministic) symmetric key encryption. While this reuse is a slight
abuse of notation, it should be obvious to the reader which scheme
is used, as we denote public key pairs as pk(·) and sk(·) and a
symmetric key as K.
Similarly, (Gen,Sign,Verify) denotes an unforgeable signature
scheme where k ← Gen(1n ) denotes a probabilistic key generation
algorithm, s := Signsk(x) (m) indicates the signature s to be the
message m signed with the secret key of x, and v := Verifypk(x) (s, m)
produces either true or f alse by verifying s is the signature of m,
using the public key of x. Let H denote a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function such that h := H(m) denotes the hash of
a message m.
Finally, let (Commit,Open) denote a non-interactive commitment scheme that is both perfectly hiding and computationally binding. c ← Commit(s) refers to the probabilistic generation of the
public commitment c for the secret value s, while Open(c, s) denotes the process of revealing of the parameters of the commitment.
Let Prove(sv(p)) denote an interactive zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge protocol in which the prover p demonstrates knowledge
of a secret value sv. Finally, Auth(ids , pwds , r) denotes an authentication protocol in which the user provides password pwds to
prove the claim to identity ids , and r indicates a requested role.
Figure 4 shows our basic access protocol. It is initiated by a
subject s ∈ S to request read permission on object o ∈ O, while
using role r ∈ R. The request is made using client ci at location
ldj,k . The protocol starts by s using his proximity device to prove
knowledge of sv(s) to ldj,k and entering ids , pwds , and r into the
client via a trusted path. The client presents a signed version of
ids to ldj,k via the physical connection, and ldj,k responds with a
commitment c, binding ids to ci at timestamp T with a nonce n.
Note that only ldj,k is able to open this commitment. ci signs the
commitment, sending the result to the AS. The AS and ci then enter
an authentication protocol that confirms the identity of ids and his
authorization to enter r.
Assuming the authentication of s is successful, the AS returns
a signed version of the commitment c, encrypted in a manner that
is only readable by ci . ci decrypts the signed commitment, and
forwards the result to ldj,k , who confirms the signature of the AS
(thus indicating that the AS received the commitment intact). ldj,k
opens the commitment and encrypts the result with the public key

of the AS. ci forwards the encrypted packet and the name of the
object o requested, and the AS returns the encrypted object with
a key bound to ci . Note that, while this protocol describes read
actions, it is straightforward to extend it to handle write actions.

4.3

Algorithms

Policy evaluation occurs after step 10 of the access control protocol in Figure 4. The Request algorithm, defined below, attempts
to activate the spatial role based on the user’s location. If the activation is successful, the policies are evaluated and the on-going
conditions (in the case of while constraints) are determined. Assuming the initial conditions are satisfied, the algorithm returns approval and the object is sent in step 11 of the protocol.
Request(s, o, ci , a, r)
Input: s: the requesting subject; o: the requested object; ci : the client;
a: the requested action
Output: approved or denied
1. if Activate(s, r, Location(s)) = f ailure then return denied
2. satisf ied ← EvalP olicies(s, P olicies[o][a])
3. if satisf ied = ∅ then return denied
4. ongoing ← ∅
5. foreach p = < sr, a, o, φ > ∈ satisf ied
6.
ongoing ← ongoing ∪ W henT oBool(p, Location(s))
7. Ongoing(s) = Ongoing(s) ∪ {< o, ci , ongoing >}
8. return approve

The policy evaluation procedure is defined in the EvalPolicies
algorithm. The AS identifies the relevant policies for the object and
action, determines if the user has an activated role that satisfies the
policy, then proceeds to evaluate the proximity constraints. The
algorithm returns the set of policies that are satisfied, as these policies may have on-going conditions (i.e., while clauses) that must
be continuously enforced.
EvalPolicies(s, P (o, a))
Input: s: the requesting subject; P (o, a): the set of matching policies
Output: satisf ied: the set of policies that have been satisfied
1. foreach p = < sr, a, o, ϕ > ∈ P (o, a), sr = < rp , pap >
2.
permitted ← f alse
3.
foreach role = < rs , pas > in ActiveRoles(s)
4.
if rs ≥ rp and pas v pap then
5.
permitted ← true
6.
if permitted = true then
7.
foreach w clause in ϕ
8.
foreach constraint in w
9.
evaluate constraint based on location information
10.
evaluate w clause based on constraint satisfaction
10.
if w is satisfied satisfied then
11.
satisf ied ← satisf ied ∪ {p}
12. return satisf ied

The constraint evaluation is a straightforward evaluation based
on the location information maintained by AS and the specified
topological relation. For instance, consider the constraint
when at least 1 Supervisor in Room 105
The AS simply checks to see if there is at least one person in Room
105 who has Supervisor as an active role. If the constraint instead
specified
when at least 1 Supervisor in F loor 1
then the AS would compute the sum of all users with an active Supervisor role who are present anywhere on the first floor. If the
constraint uses the this keyword, the algorithm traverses the parent hierarchy to find the correct PA based on the user’s PA. Hence,
the policy evaluation has a linear complexity based on identifying
the PAs that are relevant to the constraint.

4.4 Prototype Implementation
We have developed a proof-of-concept prototype of Prox-RBAC
to measure the performance of the cryptographic protocols and
the enforcement algorithms. To instantiave the Prove construct,
we employed the Feige-Fiat-Shamir identification protocol [11],
which uses a zero-knowledge proof, and we use a Pedersen commitment [19] for the Commit and Open primitives. For Auth, we
simply used a salted hash of a password. We used SHA-256, AES256, 1024-bit RSA, and SHA-1 with DSA for the Hash, Enck ,
Encpk(c) , and Signk primitives, respectively. We implemented our
prototype in Java 1.6.0_20, relying on standard cryptographic implementations when possible. For the Pedersen commitment and
the Feige-Fiat-Shamir protocols, we used a custom implementation
that employed the BigInteger class. Our test machine consisted of a
2.26GHz Intel R CoreTM 2 Duo CPU with 3GB of 667MHz memory, running on Ubuntu 10.04 (“Lucid Lynx”) with version 2.6.32
of the Linux kernel. Based on 500 iterations, the most expensive
of the cryptographic operations are the Pedersen commitment (average of 17.7 ms to generate and 20.2 ms to confirm) and RSA (5.7
ms to encrypt, but 30.2 ms to decrypt). Other than the DSA signature (9.8 ms average), all other computations required less than
1 ms on average to complete. The average time for the complete
Read protocol (including the policy evaluation algorithms) was approximately 89.4 ms.
Moving toward a practical deployment with location sensing is
more challenging. We have performed preliminary work toward
using an Advanced Card Systems (ACS) NFC reader, model ACR
122 to communicate with a Nokia 6131 NFC-enabled cell phone.
Communication between the ACR 122 and the Nokia 6131 uses the
peer-to-peer extension to the Java JSR 257 Contactless Communication API. Our software employs the NFCIP library8 , which uses
the Java smartcardio libraries. One difficulty we had with this implementation is that the BigInteger class does not exist in the Java
ME distribution. Consequently, deploying a protocol such as the
Feige-Fiat-Shamir scheme requires developing one’s own solution
for large integers. However, based on our experiments, we observe
that the average computation time for generating the Feige-FiatShamir proof is less than the amount of time to perform the AES
encryption in the protocol. Thus, such a deployment is feasible.
The final challenge in developing a practical implementation of
Prox-RBAC is enforcement of the one-way movement through entry points. In our current prototype, we use the NFC phone to
connect to a reader that would (in a real deployment) control the
lock to a door. To confirm passage, the user would have to use the
NFC phone to connect to a reader on the other side of the door.
Clearly, this approach is inelegant, and a more desirable solution
would include other forms of sensing to detect the user’s movement. In addition, our prototype does not include proximity-based
communication between the client (i.e., a laptop) and the entry. For
completeness and to prevent data leakage, the entry points should
be equipped with a means to detect when a laptop is leaving the PA
and revoking permissions as necessary.

4.5 Functional Correctness
In this section, we use the protocol and algorithm specifications
to demonstrate that our prototype correctly enforces the Prox-RBAC
semantics as defined. Due to space constraints, we will only offer
sketches of proofs and leave full consideration for the full version
of the paper.
Lemma 1: The access protocol defined in Figure 4 prevents unauthorized access under the Dolev-Yao adversarial model.
8

Available download at http://code.google.com/p/nfcip-java/.

Proof: As all sensitive data is encrypted, eavesdroppers only observe signed data (preventing unauthorized modification), the object being requested, or the one-time use commitment. If the adversary modifies either of the latter two pieces of data, the user
and/or the AS would detect the corruption. Furthermore, modifying
the object requested would not give the user access to unauthorized
data. Thus, only authorized access is allowed.
Lemma 2: The policy evaluation algorithms correctly enforce when
and while constraints.
Proof: The EvalPolicies algorithm includes a procedure for evaluating the initial conditions, corresponding to the when constraints.
The algorithm returns the set of satisfied policies, which are then
added to the user’s Ongoing list. This list identifies the while
constraints that must continuously be evaluated. If an Ongoing
constraint is no longer satisfied, the list entry contains the object
and client used; the AS uses this information to send a revocation
request to the client.

5.

RELATED WORK

Role-based access control (RBAC) [21] is a popular technique
for maintaining and administering access privileges in an organization. One of the advantages of RBAC is its ability to incorporate
hierarchies into the model [22, 23]. Building on the core RBAC
model, researchers have proposed extensions that integrate contextual factors [6, 8]. These extensions include temporal and spatial
constraints [9, 14, 1, 9, 20, 4, 2, 7, 5]. Our work can be viewed
as an extension of the latter category, in which spatial information
is considered as part of the access control request. However, our
work has a significantly different focus than these works.
Specifically, models for spatial RBAC systems, such as those just
identified, are based solely on the location of the user making the
request. The presence or absence of other users in the reference
space is irrelevant in those models. In contrast, our focus is to
define proximity constraints that are based on the user’s location in
relation to other users in the system. This work is the first to focus
on the specification of these relative constraints and the challenges
of their enforcement.
Two works are close in aim as our own. Team-based access control using contexts (C-TMAC) [12], like our own, incorporates both
RBAC and the location of multiple users. However, in C-TMAC,
the system only considers locations of users who are on the same
team as the requesting user, rather than all users. Furthermore, CTMAC does not specifically focus on location, but rather the more
generic notion of context (of which location is one aspect). As
such, C-TMAC does not consider the challenges of location validation and does not define a policy language. A different interpretation of proximity has previously been explored in the context
of access control. Specifically, the proximity-based access control
(PBAC) model [10, 13] considers the requesting user’s proximity
to a computer. For instance, if a temporary emergency medical center is created during a disaster response, then a doctor who is in the
immediate vicinity would be granted access. In other words, PBAC
can be viewed as considering absolute proximity, as the computer
typically has a static location. Our work, in contrast, considers
relative proximity based on the locations of other users, who are
assumed to be continually moving.
One area of study that may appear similar to our own is the question of nearest neighbor queries. For instance, Yang et al. [24] have
proposed techniques for k-nearest neighbor queries within an indoor environment. These queries are based on a minimal walking
distance metric. Although Prox-RBAC also considers the location
of other users, we do not use a uniform metric. That is, our spatial

model abstracts the distance between protected regions of varying
sizes. One interesting extension of Prox-RBAC could be to apply
k-nearest neighbor queries to our spatial model, where the distance
metric is the number of hops within the network of entry points.

6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have extended the notion of spatially aware
RBAC to incorporate proximity constraints, which specify policy
requirements that are based on the locations of other users in the
environment. We have introduced our spatial model, primarily consisting of an accessibility graph that is based on existing work on
graph-based indoor space models. We have also defined the syntax
and semantics for the Prox-RBAC language for specifying these
constraints. In addition to the formalization of our model and language, we have defined an enforcement architecture, including protocols and algorithms. We have offered preliminary results that
prove the architecture correctly meets the semantic definitions. We
have also described our initial work toward developing a prototype
Prox-RBAC system, and closed with an informal security analysis. Based on these results, we find that it is feasible to construct a
usable and efficient proximity-based RBAC system.
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